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A FIRST ARGUMENT IN THE TRADITION OF MANY
Beth S. Brinkmann*

INTRODUCTION

I first argued before the Supreme Court of the United States
on March 23, 1994. I knew when I was hired as an Assistant to
the Solicitor General that my job would be to brief and to argue
cases before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States.
So when the time came for my first argument, I was readyready, that is, for the legal argument and for the difficult
questions. I was not prepared, however, for the tremendous
sense of honor that I felt when I entered the courtroom that day.
I had experienced a similar feeling when I served as a law
clerk to Justice Blackmun several years earlier. The majesty of
the Supreme Court building is awe-inspiring even to a casual
visitor, and actually working in the building and participating in
the business of the Court is the opportunity of a lifetime. The
same is true of appearing as an oral advocate before the
Supreme Court. I have had the good fortune of arguing eighteen
more cases there over the past nine years, and I have felt the
same sense of honor each time, including the day last year when
I argued before the Court for the first time as a lawyer in private
practice.
Regardless of the number of times that an attorney appears
before the Court, the responsibility to the client is always
tremendous and the broader significance of the case is
inescapable. That responsibility and significance are the driving
forces behind an attorney who engages in the rigorous
preparation that a Supreme Court argument demands.
Beth S. Brinkmann, a former Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States, is of
counsel to the Washington, D.C., office of Morrison & Foerster LLP, where she is a
member of the appellate practice group in the firm's litigation department.
*
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THE PREPARATION

When I began work as an Assistant to the Solicitor General
in December 1993, it was unclear when I would be given my
first oral-argument assignment. The Court had just completed its
third of seven argument sessions for the Term. The Justices
would hear argument again for six days during each of the
remaining four argument sessions. There was not enough time
for me to brief a case that would be argued during the January or
February argument sessions, so I hoped that I would get an
assignment for March or April, but that depended on which
cases the Court decided to hear and which were not already
being handled by one of the other attorneys in the office. I knew
that I might have to wait until the next Term, which would begin
the following October. The precise date of my first argument did
not preoccupy me for long, however, because my workload
would not permit such a distraction. I immersed myself in
drafting briefs for the Supreme Court and writing
recommendations for the Solicitor General. At the same time, I
tried to take advantage of the opportunities available to watch
oral arguments before the Court, especially arguments by other
attorneys in the office.
Because the Office of the Solicitor General handles all of
the work for the United States in the Supreme Court, attorneys
who have worked in the office are the most experienced
advocates before the Court. That is particularly true of the
Deputy Solicitors General, three of whom are career attorneys
who have argued Cases for decades. So I made sure to attend
oral arguments by several of the Deputies, as well as those of
Solicitor General Drew S. Days, III, who was an experienced
Supreme Court advocate from his time as an Assistant Attorney
General in the late 1970s. I also went up to the Court to watch
other well-known advocates and other Assistants argue when I
could take an hour out of my workday. Of course, I had watched
many arguments during the 1986-1987 Term when I served as a
law clerk, but now that I was preparing to stand at the podium
myself, that seemed a very long time ago and my memory of the
details was vague. Moreover, watching arguments with the
knowledge that I would be the one having to answer the
Justices' questions in the near future significantly altered my
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perspective. I now found myself not only analyzing the legal
arguments of the advocates, but also their argument strategies
and styles, as I waited for my turn.
It came on March 2, 1994, when the Solicitor General
assigned New York Department of Taxation v. Milhem Attea &
Brothers to me for oral argument. In Attea, cigarette wholesalers
challenged the system that the State of New York had set up to
collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to people who bought
cigarettes at stores on an Indian reservation but were not
members of the Tribe. Under federal law, the State could not tax
on-reservation sales of cigarettes to members of the Tribe, but
could tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-members. The
problem for the State was how to collect the tax within the
confines of the Indian Trader Statutes ' and federal law doctrines
that prohibited the State from unduly burdening commerce with
the Tribe.
I had been assigned the Attea case soon after my arrival as
my first case to brief. That assignment did not, however, mean
that I would be assigned the case to argue as well. Argument
assignments could not be made until closer in time to the date of
oral argument. The Solicitor General first had to see which cases
were scheduled on which dates during the particular two-week
argument session in order to identify the cases that would be
argued by the Assistants, the cases that would be argued by the
Deputy Solicitors General, and indeed, the cases that he would
handle himself. As it turned out, it fell to me to argue Attea, and
I was pleased to get the assignment.
The United States had an interest in Attea because it was
expected that the Court's opinion could set forth broad
principles that would determine what regulations States
generally would be authorized to impose incident to collecting
taxes from non-Tribal members who purchase goods on tribal
reservations. It was the job of the Solicitor General's office to
consult with the various components of the federal government
that could be affected by the case and to consider all of those
interests to determine if the federal government had a particular
perspective that should be presented to the Court.

1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 261 etseq.
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The attorneys in the Appellate Section of the Environment
and Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice
prepared a draft brief, as was typical, and continued to work
closely with our office as the brief and arguments were
developed further. We also worked with attorneys in the
Department of the Interior to determine what position the United
States should take in the case. And we spoke with attorneys
representing both parties, as well as amici curiae, to hear what
position they thought the United States should take and why.
That series of discussions and our own legal research led us
to conclude that the United States had a unique perspective
regarding the permissible scope of state taxation and regulation
in the case, and the Solicitor General authorized us to prepare a
brief to present that view, which we filed on January 19, 1994.
Reconciling the various interests at stake led us to draft a
somewhat unique brief. We did not support, in whole, either side
of the case. Thus, instead of filing a brief in support of either
party, we filed a brief supporting affirmance. The first part of
our brief agreed in large part with the'State's view that the court
of appeals had erred in holding that New York's scheme for precollecting taxes and incidental record-keeping was preempted by
the Indian Trader Statutes. The second part of our brief,
however, argued that, as applied, the complex system of
registration, quotas, coupons, and state-designated trade
territories on reservations conflicted with the Indian Trader
Statutes, exceeded the regulatory authority of the State, and
interfered with tribal sovereignty, because it substantially
interfered with the distribution and sale of goods to members of
the Tribe.
That brief became my initial guide as I prepared for oral
argument in early March, outlining what argument to present to
the Court and what position to take in response to questions. I
tried to take a fresh look at our case from the perspective of the
Court. I spent a lot of time during the two weeks before
argument re-examining our legal analysis, exploring the
underlying policies and what those policies meant for the
government's position in related contexts, re-reading the
authorities relevant to a somewhat arcane treaty argument we
had made, reviewing the Indian Trader Statutes and licenses
issued thereunder, analyzing compacts between Tribes and other
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States that the Court had referenced in earlier decisions, and rereading the line of relevant Supreme Court precedent and the
lower court rulings. I also again reviewed the briefs filed by the
parties and the other amici.
As I prepared, I tried to keep in the forefront of my mind
the fact that I was allotted only ten minutes for argument, as is
typical for the United States when it participates as amicus
curiae before the Court. The brevity of the argument obviously
meant that I had to focus on making my opening statement and
my responses to questions as succinct as possible. That effort to
distill legal arguments down to their essentials is, in my view,
one of the most intellectually rigorous exercises an attorney can
perform. It undoubtedly is one of the best uses of an oral
advocate's preparation time.
Then came my moot courts. The first piece of advice that I
give to anyone asking for recommendations for oral argument
preparation is to participate in two moot courts. Moot courts are
part of the rich tradition in the Solicitor General's office which
prepares so many advocates for their first arguments. Standing
up for an hour or more answering every question that very smart
lawyers have concocted after reading the same briefs that the
Court will have read ensures that you have done your best to
prepare answers to likely questions. The attorneys with whom I
had worked on the brief participated, of course. But it was by
having other Assistants in the office who had not worked on the
brief sit in the role of Justices that I got a sense of what
impression the briefs in the case had likely left on the Court.
The moot courts also served as a reality check. I really was
going to argue before the Supreme Court, and soon.
Finally, as the day approached, I learned that there were
still other details to address. I wrote a letter to the Clerk of the
Court requesting reserved seats for some officials from the
Department of the Interior. My good friends Karen Jackson and
John Sandage also came to my argument to give me moral
support. Indeed, over the course of my next several years in the
Solicitor General's office, many family members and friends,
including my parents, my sister, my brother, my husband, my inlaws, old friends, and friends' parents used my arguments as a
reason to come watch the Supreme Court in action, which turned
out to be a wonderful experience. I most appreciated my niece
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and nephew attending a few years later (while they were still in
middle school), especially when they provided me their views
on the case afterwards and demonstrated a remarkable
understanding of a complex employment-contract case. My
sister also played a crucial role in my preparation for that first
argument-she got up extra early on the morning of my
argument to telephone me and make sure that I did not
oversleep!
THE DAY OF ARGUMENT

When the morning of argument arrived, I realized that I
need not have worried about oversleeping. I had hardly slept at
all. I went to my office early to sit calmly for an hour reviewing
my notes and playing through in my mind my answers to
anticipated questions. I remember also sitting there for a
moment or two realizing how amazing that day was. There I
was, at the age of 35, about to represent the United States in oral
argument before the Supreme Court. It could not get better than
that.
I also was keenly aware that Justice Blackmun would be on
the Bench that morning. I was so proud that he would see me
argue before the Court. After all, his giving me the opportunity
to serve as his law clerk years earlier undoubtedly was one of
the reasons that I had been hired in the Solicitor General's office
in the first place. Yet, I also felt an added pressure because I had
to make sure that my argument did not disappoint him. As it
turned out, that was the last Term that Justice Blackmun served
on the Court. He announced his retirement later that year. I then
appreciated all the more the fact that my turn to argue had come
while he was still on the Bench to participate.
At the appointed hour, I went downstairs to the van that
takes the attorneys from the Solicitor General's office up to the
Court. I sat there quietly, unable to participate in the regular
banter that day, taking a deep breath when I saw the Supreme
Court building come into view at the top of the hill. When we
arrived at the Court, I spoke briefly with the Deputy Solicitor
General on the case, Edwin S. Kneedler, with whom I had
worked both in drafting the brief and in preparing for argument.
I could not have asked for a more experienced or helpful guide.
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It was when Ed and I entered the courtroom and sat down next
to respondents' counsel that I felt an overwhelming sense of
honor at having the privilege to appear before the Court. Then,
when the Marshal of the Court announced the entrance of "the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States," and the Members of the Court walked
through the heavy red curtains, a sense of patriotism welled up
inside me as I felt that I truly was participating in American
history being made. Once the Justices seated themselves,
however, and the argument in the first case began, my attention
was focused again, in its entirety, on the substance of my case
and my responsibility to my client. I do not remember having
another stray thought until after the Court adjourned at the end
of arguments.
When the argument in my case finally began, I listened
intently to the attorney for petitioner, the Attorney General of
New York. It was clear from the Court's questioning that the
Justices had read our brief carefully. They repeatedly asked how
they could decide the case without addressing the burdens that
we had suggested the scheme would place on tribal retailers.
Throughout the arguments by petitioner and respondents, the
Court continued to focus on the narrowness of the issues before
them. Thus, I was prepared for the Court's questions about the
details of the government's position and our focus on the tribal
retailers instead of the non-member wholesalers who had
challenged the tax scheme. Sensing that the Court might leave
for another day some of the issues that we found most troubling
regarding the burdens on Indian sovereignty, I attempted to
clarify as precisely as I could where we agreed with the parties
and where we disagreed. We could hope that the Court would
not reach those troubling issues if they were inclined to rule
against us. When my ten minutes were over, I could hardly
believe it. The time had passed so quickly.
One of my most lasting impressions of that argument was
the attention that every Member of the Court gave to the case
during the entire hour of argument. Every Justice appeared
genuinely interested in hearing the attorneys' answers to each
question. Although I had participated in more than a dozen
felony jury trials, as well as a few civil trials, and had argued
several cases in the federal courts of appeals before very
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esteemed judges, I had never before seen judges give the
attorneys such a full opportunity to persuade them of their view.
When I returned to my office, I felt the exhaustion of a
person whose adrenaline was finally slowing down after a long
run. The last thing I wanted to do was sit at my desk, let alone
read anything related to one' of my other cases in some other
area of law. I tried to fight the inevitable inclination to reargue
the case in my mind and think of better answers that I could
have given. So, I spent the afternoon discussing with other
attorneys in the office all the questions that we could recall and
debating their significance.
The Supreme Court gave us the answer on June 13, 1994,
when it issued an opinion holding that the State's tax
regulations, on their face, did not violate the Indian Trader
Statutes.2 Of particular interest to us was the fact that the Court
declined to assess whether features of the tax scheme would
affect tribal self-government or federal authority over Indian
affairs, and that it limited its ruling to the Indian Trader Statutes.
The Court acknowledged that the provisions regarding quotas
and trade territories, about which we had voiced particular
concern with regard to the rights of tribal retailers, may present
significant problems depending on how they were applied, but
left those questions to be addressed in future proceedings. Thus,
although the Court did not affirm the judgment as we had urged,
we felt some measure of victory in avoiding a broader
proclamation by the Court that would have curtailed tribal selfgovernment or federal authority over Indian affairs.
FURTHER REFLECTIONS

In the years since my first argument, I have spoken
numerous times to groups of attorneys and law students about
one or another of my arguments or, more generally, about oral
advocacy before the Supreme Court. Nearly every time, I have
been asked about how it is different to argue as a woman before
the Court.
The short answer is that it is not at all different. In my
experience both arguing before the Court and observing
2. N.Y. Dept. of Taxn. v. Milhem Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
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countless others do so, it has always been clear to me that what
the Court cares about is an attorney's ability to present the case
effectively and to respond directly to questions from the Court.
It certainly did not make any difference in my preparation for
my first argument. I was focused solely on my, case-the law,
the facts, the likely questions that would be asked, Indian law
doctrines, the New York State tax scheme, and countless other
matters of significance, not my gender. Frankly, there was no
room in my mind for me to be concerned about anything else.'
In addition, when I prepared for my first argument, I did
not expect it to be any different as a woman attorney because I
knew that it was not at all unusual for women to appear as
advocates before-the Supreme Court. I had seen that to be true
during my clerkship year-October Term 1986, during which
more than three dozen women argued before the Court. In at
least two cases, attorneys on both sides of the case were
women.4 The women advocates that Term included prominent
attorneys such as Elizabeth Holtzman, then Kings County
District Attorney, who argued New York v. Burger,5 and Judith
Resnick, now a professor at Yale Law School, who argued for
appellees in the Rotary Club case.' Moreover, there were a
significant number of women serving as law clerks to Members
of the Court that Term. If my memory serves me correctly, I was
one of eleven women out of approximately thirty-four law
clerks. Also, at the reunion of Justice Blackmun's law clerks that
year, I met countless women whom he had hired as law clerks in
years past (not surprising for the father of three successful
daughters), including two who later were appointed judges on
3. Later, there did come a time when I felt somewhat different arguing as a woman,
and that was when I argued two cases while I was pregnant. Even then, I really was not
much different from any male attorney who might happen to be sick or nauseous the
morning of his argument-a not uncommon phenomenon experienced by Supreme Court

advocates preparing to face the barrage of questioning. Also, several women before me had
argued while pregnant, and several have since, without its ever becoming an issue. Indeed,
I can think of at least ten Supreme Court arguments presented by pregnant attorneys. I did
feel, however, that I had a responsibility to ensure that my pregnancy did not, in any way,
affect -my preparation or argument because I would risk adversely affecting the chances of
arguments being assigned to similarly situated women in the future.
4. See Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481

U.S. 615 (1987).
5. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
6. Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Intl. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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the federal courts of appeals. In other words, in the pool of
Supreme Court law clerks-the group of attorneys whose
members are among those most likely to later practice before the
Supreme Court-thirty percent were women my year and many
women had come before that as well.
I also was keenly aware of the true pioneers in the
generations of legal advocates before mine. I had spent a year
serving as a law clerk for an outstanding member of the
Eleventh Circuit who happens to be a woman, the Honorable
Phyllis A. Kravitch. Like both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Ginsburg, Judge Kravitch is one of those women attorneys of an
earlier generation to which the women of my generation owe a
great debt. Unlike Justice Ginsburg, Judge Kravitch never had
the opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court, but she
became one of the leading trial and appellate advocates in
Georgia, and was the first woman to win election to the Georgia
Superior Court (in 1976). In 1979, she became the third woman
appointed to a federal court of appeals. Judge Kravitch teaches
her law clerks the significance of legal ability, dedication, and
hard work to achieving success as an attorney, despite whatever
obstacles might arise because of gender or similar factors. Judge
Kravitch now recounts stories about instances of unfair
treatment based on her gender only because she knows that they
would not happen today. She also does not fail to appreciate the
irony in many of those stories, and even the humor in some.
The morning of my first argument, I found myself recalling
one of Judge Kravitch's experiences at the moment when I
caught sight of the Supreme Court building as we drove up the
hill. I was thinking of the history of the building and suddenly
remembered a story from its early years. After serving on the
editorial board of the law review and graduating second in her
class at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1944,
Judge Kravitch was interviewed by a Justice of the Supreme
Court for a position as his law clerk. She had been commended
to the Justice by a colleague based on a recommendation
provided by her law school's dean, and the interview went well.
Nonetheless, the Justice candidly informed her that his first offer
was going instead to a male applicant who was no better
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qualified. The Justice explained that "the Court had never had a
female clerk and he hesitated to be the one to break precedent." 7
After she also was refused employment by both New York
and Philadelphia law firms because of her gender (and, in one
instance, because of her religion), Judge Kravitch returned to
Savannah, and entered the law practice of her father, Aaron
Kravitch. She became a member of the Bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, along with her father, on January 13,
1948, the day on which her father presented argument in Toomer
v. Witsell.s She appeared on brief in that case and on certiorari
petitions in another half dozen cases over the course of the
following decade or so. Needless to say, when I approached the
Court for my first appearance as an advocate before it, I could
not help but feel a sense of satisfaction (as I had when I was
hired as a law clerk there) knowing that I was joining the ranks
of women who had righted an historical wrong.
Finally, shortly after my arrival at the Solicitor General's
office, I had learned more about the history of government
attorneys appearing before the Court, which further confirmed
that there is a rich, albeit little known, tradition of women
advocates. I met Harriet S. Shapiro, who had been working in
the office since being hired by Solicitor General Griswold in
1972 as the office's first woman attorney. She had presented
seventeen arguments before the Court in her first decade there,
and eventually continued in a part-time position even after her
official retirement. Soon after I started, Harriet told me that I
was "Number Ten," and then explained that I was the tenth
female Assistant hired in the office. (Three women also had
served as Deputy Solicitors General by then.) Like Judge
Kravitch, Harriet downplayed her role as a woman attorney, and
she focused, instead, on her role as a government attorney in the
best traditions of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Department of Justice. Nonetheless, Harriet Shapiro's presence
in the office paved the way for other women attorneys, and her
trailblazing role cannot be discounted.
7. Phyllis A. Kravitch, Bernita Shelton Matthews Meml. Lecture in Law, Women in
the Legal Profession: The Past 100 Years (U. of Miss. L. Sch., University, Miss., Spring
1999), in 69 Miss. L. J. 57, 66 (1999); see also Sonny Lufrano, Honoring "Your Honor",
Atlanta Jewish Times 14 (Nov. 24, 2000).
8. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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The tradition of women advocates before the Supreme
Court dates back to the first argument by Belva Ann Lockwood
in 1880. 9 That was followed by a series of arguments by two
women tax lawyers on behalf of the government during
Prohibition."' Some of the most prominent arguments by women
have included Justice Ginsburg's appearances before the Court
in a half-dozen landmark sex discrimination cases in the 1970s,"
the many arguments by now-Judge Constance Baker Motley on
behalf of the NAACP in school desegregation cases," and even
the argument by the daughter of Justice Brandeis in 1925. "
Women employed as attorneys elsewhere in the federal
government also argued before the Court on behalf of the United
States at a time when women were not yet hired to work as
attorneys in the Solicitor General's office. Most significantly,
Beatrice Rosenberg, who served in the Criminal Division's
Appellate Section (which she ultimately headed) at the
Department of Justice, argued dozens of cases before the4
Supreme Court beginning in the 1940s through the early 1970s.1
Bessie Margolin, who served at the Department of Labor and
9. Unfortunately, when Lockwood first applied to be admitted to the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1876, the Court denied the motion to move her
admission, citing the fact that "none but men are permitted to practice before it as attorneys
and counselors," and explaining that the Court did not feel "called upon to make a change
until such a change is required by statute or a more extended practice in the highest courts
of the States." Jill Norgren, Belva A. Lockwood: First Woman Member of the Supreme
Court Bar and First Woman to Argue Before the Court, in S. Ct. Historical Socy., Supreme
Court Decisions and Women's Rights 207, 214 (Clare Cushman, ed., CQ Press 2001). Over
the course of the next two years, Lockwood drafted federal legislation which, after much
lobbying, was enacted by Congress to require admission of women to practice before the
Supreme Court of the United States. Id.; see also An Act to Relieve Certain Legal
Disabilitiesof Women, 20 Stat. 292, ch. 81 (1879) (" [A]ny woman who shall have been a
member of the bar of the highest court of any State or Territory or of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia for... three years.... shall have maintained a good standing
before such court, and ... shall be a person of good moral character, shall ... be admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States."). In 1879, Lockwood became
the first woman admitted to practice before the Court and, in 1880, became the first woman
member of the Supreme Court Bar to participate in oral argument. She also argued before
the Court for two days in 1906, at the age of 76. Norgren, supra this note, at 215-216.
10. Clare Cushman, Women Advocates Before the Court, in Supreme Court Decisions
and Women's Rights, supra n. 9, at 227.
11. Id. at 229.
12. id. at 224.
13. See Frank B. Gilbert, Susan Brandeis: A Justice's Daughter Argues Before His
Court, in Supreme Court Decisions and Women's Rights, supra n. 9, at 234.
14. Cushman, supra n. 10, at 228-29.
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was a key figure in the development of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, arFued almost as many from the 1940s through the mid1960s.
I continue to witness firsthand the enduring impact made
by earlier generations of women advocates, including working
now at my law firm with Shirley M. Hufstedler, who, in 1968,
became the second woman appointed to a federal court of
appeals. After leaving the bench to serve as Secretary of
Education, she returned to private practice, is still practicing
before the Supreme Court, and argued before the Court as
recently as 1996.16
My generation has its own growing group of women
Supreme Court advocates, although most of the women who
argue before the Court, like their male counterparts, often have
only one or two opportunities in their careers to do so. Most are
attorneys in state attorney generals' offices, members of the
criminal defense bar, law professors, or counsel to publicinterest organizations. The attorneys in private practice who
return to the Court on a regular basis tend to be from a much
smaller pool of attorneys who served in the Office of the
Solicitor General, clerked at the Supreme Court, or both. The
women in that group include several alumna who preceded me
at the Office of the Solicitor General and then went into private
practice, such as Maureen E. Mahoney, Kathryn A. Oberly,
Carolyn F. Corwin, and Barbara E. Etkind.' 7 Moreover, during
my eight years in the office, five more women were hired as
Assistants and a woman again served as Deputy Solicitor
General. As those ranks continue to grow and other women at
law firms continue to develop appellate practices, the number of
women advocates in private practice who enjoy repeat
appearances before the Court undoubtedly will grow as well.

15. Id.
16. Exxon Co., USA v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830(1996).
17. See Cushman, supra n. 10, at 226-227.

